

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

[2025] SGCA 37

Court of Appeal / Criminal Motion No 18 of 2025

Between

Chandroo Subramaniam

... Applicant

And

Public Prosecutor

... Respondent

JUDGMENT

[Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Sentencing — Execution — Stay of execution — Applicant seeking stay of execution to obtain fresh evidence — Whether permission to make post-appeal application in capital case should be granted — Section 60G Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed)]

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Chandroo Subramaniam

v

Public Prosecutor

[2025] SGCA 37

Court of Appeal — Criminal Motion No 18 of 2025
Steven Chong JCA
25 July 2025

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Steven Chong JCA:

1 Mr Chandroo Subramaniam (“Chandroo”) is a prisoner awaiting capital punishment. A day before his scheduled execution date, Chandroo filed an application for a stay of execution. I have treated his application as an application for permission to make a stay application under s 60G(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “SCJA”), as the provision requires an applicant seeking to file a stay application to first apply for permission from this Court (see *Sulaiman bin Jumari v PP* [2024] SGCA 40 (“*Sulaiman*”) at [9]–[11]).

2 The primary basis for Chandroo’s application is that he needs time to obtain evidence from a material witness who has only been located a few days ago. I dismiss the permission application. In short, Chandroo has not adduced any new material in support of his application. As there is no evidence placed before this Court to assess the relevance of the alleged new material, any

permission granted to file a stay application based on the non-existent evidence would be futile. In any event, I am satisfied that any evidence from the said witness will not have any bearing on Chandroo's conviction and sentence or the dismissal of his appeal. Other allegations raised by Chandroo are either incomprehensible or are without any merit.

Facts and procedural history

The trial

3 In HC/CC 36/2018, Chandroo, together with Kamalnathan a/l Muniandy ("Kamalnathan") and Pravinash a/l Chandran ("Pravinash"), were charged, tried and convicted for drug trafficking offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) ("MDA") in relation to three blocks of vegetable matter containing not less than 1,344.5g of cannabis (the "Drugs"). Specifically, Chandroo was charged under s 5(1)(a) read with ss 5(2) and 12 of the MDA for abetment by engaging in a conspiracy with Kamalnathan and Pravinash to traffic the Drugs.

4 The Prosecution's case was that Chandroo had ordered the Drugs from a Malaysian drug supplier for \$4,000, and Kamalnathan and Pravinash were tasked to deliver the Drugs to Chandroo from Malaysia to Singapore (*Public Prosecutor v Chandroo Subramaniam and others* [2020] SGHC 206 ("*Chandroo (HC)*") at [3]). According to the Prosecution, all three accused persons were privy to this arrangement and met at Kranji Road on 5 March 2016 (the "Meeting") for this purpose (*Chandroo (HC)* at [18]). The Prosecution submitted that the three elements of the offence were made out: (a) Chandroo was a party to the agreement for Pravinash and Kamalnathan to traffic the Drugs to him; (b) Chandroo knew that the Drugs to be collected pursuant to that agreement were cannabis, as he was the intended purchaser and recipient of the

Drugs and was found with \$4,000 in cash to pass to Pravinash and Kamalanathan; and (c) Chandroo intended to traffic the Drugs thereafter to other persons, as inferred from the weight of the Drugs and the absence of evidence that he had only intended to consume them (*Chandroo (HC)* at [21]).

5 Chandroo denied knowledge of the conspiracy to traffic the Drugs. He claimed to have met Pravinash and Kamalnathan at Kranji Road that day because he was liaising with them to repay a loan to one “Kumar”, his friend in Malaysia (*Chandroo (HC)* at [32]). Chandroo claimed that he had handed \$20 and a plastic bag to Kamalnathan, who told him to wait at the Kranji MRT station coffee shop (*Chandroo (HC)* at [33]).

6 The trial judge (the “Judge”) held that the evidence before him, including Chandroo’s own evidence, emphatically suggested that there was an agreed arrangement for Chandroo, Pravinash and Kamalnathan to meet on 5 March 2016 (*Chandroo (HC)* at [46] and [54]). As to the inconsistent testimonies on the purpose of the Meeting, the Judge accepted Pravinash’s evidence that the purpose was to deliver the three blocks to Chandroo. The Judge found Pravinash’s evidence to be consistent throughout the proceedings and likely to be true as it was inculpatory (*Chandroo (HC)* at [61]–[62]).

7 The Judge rejected Chandroo’s evidence that he had intended to pass money to Pravinash and Kamalnathan for the loan repayment. First, Chandroo gave three different accounts on what the \$4,000 was for, and failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for this inconsistency (*Chandroo (HC)* at [69]). Second, it was unclear why Chandroo felt the need to take out an interest-bearing loan to repay the alleged loan at that specific point in time – on his own evidence, Kumar had not asked for repayment, and the loan was interest-free (*Chandroo (HC)* at [71]). Further, if the repayment was indeed urgent,

Chandroo could have made the repayment when the interest-bearing loan had been disbursed to him earlier in February 2016 (*Chandroo (HC)* at [72]). Finally, the manner in which Chandroo, Pravinash and Kamalnathan interacted suggested that the purpose of the Meeting was to traffic the Drugs (*Chandroo (HC)* at [75]). In particular, if the intended transaction was to hand over moneys for a loan repayment, there was no good reason for them to regroup at the coffee shop upon being alerted to the presence of the police in the vicinity (*Chandroo (HC)* at [78]). There was also no other good reason for Chandroo to hand over the plastic bags to Kamalnathan (*Chandroo (HC)* at [82]).

8 Having found that there was an arrangement to meet on 5 March 2016 for the delivery of the Drugs to Chandroo (*Chandroo (HC)* at [83]), it followed that Chandroo intended to be a party to an agreement to do an unlawful act of drug trafficking (*Chandroo (HC)* at [116]). On the element of knowledge, there was “no doubt” Chandroo had actual knowledge of the nature of the Drugs (*Chandroo (HC)* at [119] and [122]). The way the \$4,000 was tied as a bundle suggested that it was to be handed over in a single transaction in exchange for the Drugs, and as the intended purchaser, Chandroo must have known what he was buying in exchange for the payment of \$4,000 (*Chandroo (HC)* at [120]). It was also relevant that the Meeting was surreptitiously conducted at night along Kranji Road and that the plastic bags handed by Chandroo to Kamalnathan were to be used as carrier bags for the Drugs (*Chandroo (HC)* at [121]).

9 On the final element of intention to on-traffic, the Judge accepted the Prosecution’s submission that Chandroo intended to traffic the Drugs to someone other than himself, considering the weight of the Drugs and the lack of evidence of Chandroo’s heavy cannabis consumption pattern (*Chandroo*

(*HC*) at [123]). The Judge also noted that Chandroo did not run any defence of consumption (*Chandroo (HC)* at [123]).

10 Chandroo was sentenced to suffer the mandatory death penalty. He did not qualify for the alternative sentencing regime under s 33B(1)(a) of the MDA, as he was not found to be a courier and was not issued a Certificate of Substantive Assistance (“CSA”).

The appeal

11 In CA/CCA 38/2020 (“CCA 38”), Chandroo appealed against his conviction and sentence. The Prosecution’s case was generally aligned with the grounds delivered by the Judge (*Chandroo Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor and other appeals* [2021] SGCA 110 (“*Chandroo (CA)*”) at [27]). Chandroo’s case was that the Judge had erred in the following findings: (a) that there was an arrangement for him, Pravinash and Kamalnathan to meet on 5 March 2016 for the delivery of the Drugs to him; (b) that he had knowledge of the nature of the Drugs; and (c) that he intended to on-traffic the Drugs (*Chandroo (CA)* at [28]–[29]).

12 This Court dismissed the appeal. To summarise the key findings:

(a) First, the Judge did not err in accepting Pravinash’s account of the events and rejecting that of Chandroo’s (*Chandroo (CA)* at [47]). In particular, Chandroo’s submission that Pravinash’s evidence was unreliable because Pravinash had a motive to implicate him to obtain a CSA was rejected (*Chandroo (CA)* at [46]). There was no evidence that the Prosecution had agreed to tender a CSA to Pravinash in exchange for him implicating Chandroo and Kamalnathan (*Chandroo (CA)* at [46]). There was also no basis to interfere with the Judge’s finding that

Chandroo's account on the purpose of the Meeting lacked credibility and should be disbelieved (*Chandroo (CA)* at [54]). As Chandroo's application relates to this point, I will address this Court's reasoning in greater detail below.

(b) The Judge did not err in finding that the purpose of the Meeting was to deliver the Drugs to Chandroo. As above, I will explain the reasons below. For now, it suffices to note that this Court rejected Chandroo's argument that the plastic bags were translucent and hence could not have been meant for the Drugs (*Chandroo (CA)* at [63]). Any handover of the Drugs would have occurred at night and in private, such that the appearance of the plastic bags was irrelevant (*Chandroo (CA)* at [63]).

(c) The Judge did not err in finding that Chandroo had actual knowledge of the nature of the Drugs. The Prosecution had established a *prima facie* case of knowledge, as the evidence showed that Chandroo was the intended recipient of the Drugs. This led to a strong inference that Chandroo knew what the Drugs were and shifted the evidential burden to him (*Chandroo (CA)* at [82]). His bare denial of any involvement in drug trafficking was insufficient, and there was nothing on the evidence to suggest that he misapprehended or was ignorant of the nature of the Drugs (*Chandroo (CA)* at [83]).

(d) Finally, the Judge did not err in finding that Chandroo intended to traffic in the Drugs. Chandroo led no evidence that he was a heavy consumer of cannabis, and the considerable weight of the Drugs indicated that they could not have been for his consumption only (*Chandroo (CA)* at [85]). This Court rejected Chandroo's argument that

adverse inference ought to be drawn against the Prosecution for its failure to disclose the statements of a witness. As the latter’s evidence did not have much, if any, probative value to Chandroo’s case, the Prosecution was not in breach of any duty of disclosure (*Chandroo (CA)* at [87]).

13 As the appeal against conviction was dismissed, there was no basis to set aside the mandatory death sentence (*Chandroo (CA)* at [89]).

Post-appeal applications

14 On 26 September 2023, the applicant and 35 other inmates commenced HC/OA 987/2023, seeking declarations that two provisions to be introduced to the SCJA – namely, ss 60G(7)(d) and 60G(8) of the SCJA are void for inconsistency with Arts 9 and 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Rev Ed) (the “Constitution”). This application was struck out on 5 December 2023 (see *Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General* [2024] 4 SLR 331), and the appeal against this decision was dismissed in CA/CA 1/2024 on 27 March 2024 (see *Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General* [2024] 1 SLR 414).

15 Then, on 28 March 2024, the applicant and 35 other inmates commenced HC/OA 306/2024 for a declaration that the policy of the Legal Assistance Scheme for Capital Offences not to assign a counsel for post-appeal applications is inconsistent with Art 9 of the Constitution. This application was struck out on 20 May 2024 (*Iskandar bin Rahmat and others v Attorney-General* [2024] 5 SLR 1290), and the appeal against this decision was dismissed in CA/CA 38/2024 on 9 September 2024.

16 Subsequently on 19 September 2024, the applicant and 30 other prisoners filed HC/OA 972/2024, seeking declarations that ss 60G(7)(d), 60G(8), 60H(6) and 60I(1) of the SCJA, and s 313(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”), are void for inconsistency with Arts 9 and 12 of the Constitution. This application was also struck out on 5 February 2025 (see *Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General* [2025] SGHC 20), and no appeal was filed against this decision.

17 On 3 July 2025, the President issued an order under s 313(1)(f) of the CPC for the applicant to be executed on 25 July 2025. The applicant received the notice of execution on 18 July 2025 and subsequently filed the present application on the night of 24 July 2025.

The parties’ cases

18 In Chandroo’s affidavit, he seeks a stay of execution “for the purpose of securing a statutory declaration or otherwise evidence from a crucial witness [*ie*, Kumar]. Chandroo’s written submissions raise different grounds, the translation of which I reproduce in full below:

- 1) I do not know how to read and write. Therefore, I am requesting for a LASCO lawyer
- 2) I do not know how to read and write
- 3) Who had this 3 kilo ganja (cannabis)
- 4) Who said that I had \$4000 ganja (cannabis) money
- 5) (Illegible) brought before the Court
- 6) Kamalanan Pravana (illegible)

Chandroo’s submissions may be summarised as follows: (a) he needs time to obtain fresh evidence; (b) he needs a lawyer to assist him; (c) he questions who had the “3 kilo ganja”; and (d) he challenges the allegation that he had \$4,000.

19 The Prosecution submits that Chandroo’s application should be summarily dismissed as it has no reasonable prospect of success. This is for three reasons. First, his bare assertions cannot amount to “sufficient material”. Second, even if Chandroo is able to secure Kumar’s testimony, it cannot support any intended review application. Third, the application is an abuse of process.

The applicable law

20 As provided under s 60G(1) of the SCJA, an applicant must first obtain permission from the Court of Appeal to make a post-appeal application in a capital case (“PACC application”). The present case amounts to a PACC application as defined in s 60F of the SCJA (see also *Sulaiman* at [10]):

- (a) it is not a review application within the meaning of s 394F of the CPC, as Chandroo is not asking this Court to review the earlier decision in CCA 38;
- (b) it is made by Chandroo after the “relevant date”, *ie*, the date of this Court’s dismissal of the appeal in relation to the offence for which death sentence was imposed (*ie*, CCA 38); and
- (c) it seeks a stay of the execution of the death sentence.

21 In deciding whether to grant permission to file a PACC application, the court must consider the following matters in s 60G(7) of the SCJA:

- (a) whether the PACC application to be made is based on material (being evidence or legal arguments) that, even with reasonable diligence, could not have been adduced in court before the relevant date;

(b) whether there was any delay in filing the application for the PACC permission after the applicant or counsel for the applicant obtained the material mentioned above, and the reasons for the delay;

(c) whether s 60G(4) of the SCJA – which provides that the applicant seeking permission must file written submissions in support of the application, and such other documents as prescribed in the Rules of Court 2021, within the prescribed periods – is complied with; and

(d) whether the PACC application to be made has a reasonable prospect of success.

22 As the application turns on the first and last requirements, I address these two requirements below.

There is no basis to grant permission to file a stay of execution

23 I dismiss the application as the requirements for permission under ss 60G(7)(a) and 60G(7)(d) of the SCJA are not satisfied. I focus on Chandroo’s submission as regards the allegedly fresh evidence, which is the crux of his case.

24 I start with the requirement in s 60G(7)(a) that there must be “material (being evidence or legal arguments) that, even with reasonable diligence, could not have been adduced in court before the relevant date”. The PACC procedure is designed to cover situations where new material is raised that could not have been brought earlier (*Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General* [2024] 1 SLR 414 at [12]). Here, no such new material is placed before the court.

25 The sole basis for Chandroo’s submission is that his family members have managed to locate Kumar, who can provide evidence that is “crucial to [his] defence”. This is a bare assertion. The case of *Sinnappan a/l Nadarajah v Public Prosecutor* [2021] SGCA 10 (“*Sinnappan*”) which the Prosecution has referred to is on point. Although it is a case under s 394H(1) of the CPC, *Sinnappan* is relevant as the requirements for granting permission mirror those under s 60G(7) of the SJCA (*Mohammad Azwan bin Bohari v Public Prosecutor* [2024] 1 SLR 1271 at [16]). In *Sinnappan*, the applicant contended that there was “new evidence” of a report which challenged the key evidence that led to his conviction (at [7]). This Court rejected the permission application as the applicant has not adduced the actual report, such that the only material before the court was the applicant’s own hearsay evidence of the existence and contents of the report (*Sinnappan* at [30]). Similarly, Chandroo has only raised hearsay evidence of Kumar’s whereabouts as conveyed to him by his family members. Chandroo has not provided any evidence to show that Kumar has been found and that “Kumar A/L Achubaboo” allegedly found at the stated address is indeed the individual Chandroo had referred to in his statements and at the trial.

26 Fundamentally, Chandroo has not adduced *any* material in the form of fresh evidence from Kumar. As such, it is unclear what specific evidence Chandroo intends to rely on. He merely asserts that Kumar’s evidence would confirm that the arrangements made on 5 March 2016 was “solely for [Chandroo] to handover the money and not for any other purpose” (“Kumar’s Alleged Evidence”). But this is pure speculation. As the Prosecution submits, there is nothing to suggest that Kumar, even if located, will give a testimony that is favourable to Chandroo.

27 Further, it would be futile to grant permission to file a PACC application grounded on allegedly new evidence that is not yet available. In *Pausi bin*

Jefferdin v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2024] 1 SLR 1127 (“*Pausi*”), this Court held that a review application premised on an alleged new material that is presently unavailable and cannot be placed before the court in a review application, would serve no purpose (at [81], citing *Tangaraju s/o Suppiah v Public Prosecutor* [2023] 1 SLR 622 at [5]). There, the applicant sought to rely on fresh evidence in the form of a record of the lock-up register and CCTV footage. However, he did not provide any details of what these materials depicted, nor extended copies of these materials. As a review application premised on such materials would be futile, this Court refused the permission application. Similarly, the alleged new evidence from Kumar appears to be non-existent. In fact, it is not even clear if the said “Kumar A/L Achubaboo” exists and by when Kumar’s evidence may be obtained. In my view, the lack of any “material (being evidence or legal arguments)” adduced by Chandroo is sufficient to dispose of this application.

28 Taking Chandroo’s case as its highest *ie*, that he would be able to obtain Kumar’s Alleged Evidence within a reasonable period of time, I am not convinced that Kumar’s Alleged Evidence “could not have been adduced in court before the relevant date” (s 60G(7)(a) of the SCJA), *ie*, the date of dismissal of the appeal in CCA 38.

29 Chandroo asserts that Kumar was unavailable for the trial as he was “likely” imprisoned in Indonesia. It seems that Chandroo himself does not know whether Kumar was actually imprisoned in Indonesia. There is also no evidence of steps taken prior to the trial to locate Kumar and secure his attendance as a witness. Neither is there any evidence of such steps taken prior to and throughout the appeal in CCA 38. In *Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad v Public Prosecutor* [2024] SGCA 56 (“*Masoud*”), one of the grounds relied on by the applicant for permission to file a PACC application was that he had fresh

evidence from his step-sister (at [25(c)]). This Court refused to grant permission as the applicant “has not explained what efforts he took to locate his step-sister for the trial, the appeal and the long intervening period before her statutory declaration was given” (*Masoud* at [72]). The present case is significantly weaker as Chandroo has not even adduced Kumar’s statutory declaration. There is also no evidence as to how his family members managed to locate Kumar four days prior to Chandroo’s scheduled execution date. In essence, given the dearth of details relating to the sudden discovery of Kumar’s location, Chandroo cannot prove that Kumar’s Alleged Evidence “could not have been adduced in court before the relevant date”.

30 In fact, Chandroo’s own testimony suggests that he had ample opportunity to call Kumar as a witness but failed to do so. At the trial, Chandroo alleged that it “[had] been 2 years since [he and Kumar] have gotten back in touch”, and that they would call each other “as frequent as once in 2 to 3 days or on a weekly basis”. Chandroo also went through his contact list and gave evidence that he had saved Kumar’s number on his phone. Having chosen not to call Kumar as a witness despite being in constant contact with him, Chandroo cannot belatedly seek to rely on a PACC application to obtain allegedly fresh evidence from him.

31 For completeness, I address the requirement under s 60G(7)(d) of the SCJA which requires that the PACC application to be made has a reasonable prospect of success. In my view, the intended PACC application is completely devoid of merit. As indicated above, there is absolutely no evidence to support Chandroo’s assertion that Kumar has been found and that Kumar’s Alleged Evidence can be obtained. There is absolutely no basis for the court to grant a stay of execution so that the applicant may obtain fresh evidence from a witness

who has not been proven to exist and that he is willing to make a statutory declaration.

32 Even if Kumar’s evidence can be obtained, it is unclear how such evidence would allow the court to reach “a fair and just determination of the charge” he was convicted of. Chandroo asserts that Kumar’s evidence would prove that he had intended only to hand over the money “for the purpose of repayment of loans to [Kumar], as well as for the payment of instalments for the house [Chandroo] had purchased in Malaysia”. Although not phrased in such terms, Chandroo seems to suggest, akin to the applicant in *Masoud*, that a stay is warranted so that he may bring an application for review of his appeal in CCA 38 based on new evidence (at [34]). More specifically, Chandroo casts doubt on this Court’s decision to uphold the Judge’s finding that the purpose of the Meeting was for Kamalnathan and Pravinash to deliver the Drugs to Chandroo.

33 I reject this submission. Kumar’s Alleged Evidence has no bearing on his conviction or sentence.

34 First, the Judge disbelieved Chandroo’s evidence on the purpose of the meeting mainly due to his inconsistent account as to what the \$4,000 was for (*Chandroo (HC)* at [69]), and this Court upheld the Judge’s finding in that regard (*Chandroo (CA)* at [54]). Specifically, Chandroo’s evidence in his contemporaneous statement was that he was on his way to Malaysia to pass *all* of the \$4,000 *personally* to his “friend ... to pay money for [a] house”. Subsequently in his long statements, he claimed that \$2,000 was to repay the loan from Kumar, \$1,000 was for his house in Malaysia, and the remaining \$1,000 was for himself. At the trial, he changed his evidence again and claimed that \$2,000 was meant for Kumar and another \$2,000 was meant for the house.

This is the version that Chandroo seeks to bolster with Kumar's Alleged Evidence.

35 However, this Court has already decided in CCA 38 that Chandroo's inability to give consistent evidence on a simple and fundamental point on what the sum of \$4,000 in his possession was for, was a difficulty he would not have had if he had been telling the truth throughout (*Chandroo (CA)* at [54]). This Court also found Chandroo's explanation for the glaring discrepancies regarding the \$4,000 to be devoid of merit (*Chandroo (CA)* at [55]). In that regard, Kumar's Alleged Evidence even if adduced would at best merely support one of the three contradictory accounts that Chandroo had presented and does nothing to challenge the findings upheld in CCA 38.

36 Second, even if Kumar's Alleged Evidence is accepted at face value, it is outweighed by other probative evidence that collectively supports the Judge's finding on the purpose of the meeting. As this Court noted in CCA 38, the Judge's finding was principally based on Pravinash's evidence of the *modus operandi* adopted in past drug deliveries to customers in Singapore (*Chandroo (CA)* at [57]). This Court held that Pravinash's evidence amounted to relevant similar fact evidence giving rise to an inference that the purpose of the Meeting was to deliver the Drugs (*Chandroo (CA)* at [60]). The following facts and circumstances led to the conclusion that Chandroo was the intended recipient:

- (a) There was no other reason for Pravinash and Kamalnathan to establish any kind of contact with Chandroo, and for Chandroo to hand them \$20 with plastic bags, which are ordinarily used to store physical objects (*Chandroo (CA)* at [62(a)] and [62(d)]). On that note, the only physical items carried by Pravinash and Kamalnathan which could

reasonably have been the subject-matter of a transaction were the Drugs (*Chandroo (CA)* at [62(e)]).

(b) That Pravinash and Kamalnathan wished to adjourn to another location due to the presence of police in their vicinity suggested that they were engaged in illicit activities (*Chandroo (CA)* at [62(c)]).

(c) The need for regrouping also suggested that there was a reciprocal act expected in exchange for the \$4,000 carried by Chandroo (*Chandroo (CA)* at [62(d)]).

37 Given the overwhelming evidence above, Chandroo has no reasonable prospect of challenging, in reliance of Kumar's Alleged Evidence, the finding on the purpose of the Meeting and/or other material findings that led to his conviction. In *Masoud*, this Court rejected the permission application as the purported new evidence will not affect the applicant's conviction and sentence or the dismissal of his appeal (at [74]). The same applies to the present case. As Chandroo's intended PACC application is premised solely on the need to secure Kumar's evidence which has no bearing on his conviction and sentence or the dismissal of his appeal in CCA 38, the intended application has no reasonable prospect of success.

38 The remaining allegations at [18] can be disposed of quickly:

(a) There is no basis to grant the permission application so that he can seek a lawyer to assist him. For the above reasons, any intended PACC application or a review application has no reasonable prospect of success.

(b) It is unclear how the identity of the person who allegedly carried “3 kilo ganja” is relevant to his application. To the extent that Chandroo seeks to challenge a factual finding that led to his conviction, that is not the purpose of a PACC application.

(c) Finally, Chandroo’s consistent evidence in his statements and at the trial was that he carried the sum of \$4,000. The allegation that he now raises is completely against his own evidence and admission.

Conclusion

39 For the above reasons, I refuse to grant Chandroo’s application for permission to make a PACC application. After considering the parties’ submissions, I dismiss the application summarily without setting it down for a hearing pursuant to s 60G(8) of the SCJA.

Steven Chong
Justice of the Court of Appeal

Applicant in person;
Chin Jincheng and Jotham Tay (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for
the respondent.