ARB 005/2026 (1) Oleksei (2) Olesja (3) Oliff (4) Olexi (5) Olinijia (6) Olimipiana (7) Olley v (1) Olorun (2) Olov (3) Olumiji (4) Oluluaboe (5) Olushegun
ARB 005/2026 (1) Oleksei (2) Olesja (3) Oliff (4) Olexi (5) Olinijia (6) Olimipiana (7) Olley v (1) Olorun (2) Olov (3) Olumiji (4) Oluluaboe (5) Olushegun
January 28, 2026  Arbitration - Orders
Claim No: ARB 005/2026
IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
BETWEEN
(1) OLEKSEI
(2) OLESJA
(3) OLIFF
(4) OLEXI
(5) OLINIJIA
(6) OLIMIPIANA
(7) OLLEY
Claimants/Applicants
and
(1) OLORUN
(2) OLOV
(3) OLUMIJI
(4) OLULUABOE
(5) OLUSHEGUN
Defendants/Respondents
ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE SIR JEREMY COOKE
UPON
the Applicants’ Urgent Application No. ARB-005-2026/1 dated 13 January 2026 seeking (the “Applicant’s Injunction Application”)
AND UPON
the First and Fourth Respondent’s Acknowledgment of Service dated 16 January 2026
AND UPON
the First Respondent’s Application No. ARB-005-2026/2 dated 19 January 2026 seeking a postponement of the Hearing (the “First Respondent’s Postponement Application”)
AND UPON
hearing Counsel for the Applicants and Counsel for First Respondent and Counsel for the Fourth Respondent at a hearing held before H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke on 26 January 2026 (the “Hearing”)
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The Applicants’ Injunction Application is dismissed.
2. The First Respondent’s Postponement Application is dismissed.
3. Costs are reserved for future decision:
(a) The First and the Fourth Respondents are to make submissions in writing within three working days of this Order, of no more than 4 pages each.
(b) The Applicants are to respond to those submissions in writing (in no more than 6 pages) within three working days thereafter.
(c) The First and the Fourth Respondents may reply to those submissions in writing within two working days thereafter, limited to 2 pages each.
Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 28 January 2026
At: 10am
SCHEDULE OF REASONS
Introduction
1. The Applicants seek urgent interim injunctive relief, on notice, under Article 15.4 of Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025 (the “New Court Law”) and Article 24.3 of the DIFC Arbitration Law No. 1 of 2008 (the “Arbitration Law”) in support of a claim made in arbitral proceedings seated in Milan and pending before the Milan Chamber of Arbitration (the “Arbitration”) and intended Dubai Court proceedings (the “Intended Onshore Claim”) against the Second and Third Respondents pursuant to Article 84 of Federal Decree-Law No. 32 of 2021. A hearing was fixed for 26 January 2026 at which the First Respondent and the Fourth Respondent appeared, represented by Counsel, whilst the other three Defendants did not acknowledge service and were not represented. The First Respondent ostensibly took a neutral position in a skeleton argument served prior to the Hearing but, when represented at the Hearing, opposed the grant of the injunction and endorsed the submissions made on behalf of the Fourth Respondent who maintained that the Court had no jurisdiction to grant the orders sought. The First Respondent made further submissions as to the utility of the orders sought, the American Cyanamid tests whilst the Fourth Respondent criticised the Applicants for joining her in the proceedings at all.
2. In essence, the order sought were:
2.1. An order restraining the Respondents from validating, implementing or otherwise giving effect to the results of contested elections of 19 December 2025 for the Board and President of the First Respondent until determination of disputes relating thereto in the Milan arbitration which had been commenced on 16 January 2026, but where no arbitrator had yet been appointed.
2.2. An order requiring the preservation of all Electoral Records and any Legal Opinions relied upon or referred to in connection with the contested elections and the exclusion of the Applicants’ electoral list for potential directors and President.
3. It is said by the Applicants that what is sought is to preserve the status quo until an arbitrator, appointed under the Articles of Association of the First Respondent in relation to the disputes which have arisen between the Applicants (who sought election to the Board of Directors) and the First Respondent, can determine the rights and wrongs of the contested election. The First Applicant was excluded from election as president and the other Applicants were excluded as candidates for the Board from the vote of the members at the instigation of the Second and Third Respondents (as Managers of the First Respondent), thus permitting the election of the Fourth Respondent as President rather than the Frist Applicant and the Fifth Respondent (who also stood as a candidate for President). The primary complaint is that, two days prior to the General Assembly when elections were to take place, the Second Respondent, as the then current President decided that the electoral list “l ‘Alternativa per il Futuro”, consisting of the First Applicant as proposed President and the other members of the list as proposed directors (the “Excluded List”) should not be the subject of voting because of the “incompatibility” of the First Applicant under Article 21.2 of the Articles of the First Respondent. The new President and Board have not taken up their responsibilities as yet and under the terms of the Constitution of the First Respondent, the existing President and Board can continue to run the organisation until the validity or invalidity of the elections has been determined.
4. There was not only a question of jurisdiction for the Court to determine but the Respondents who appeared before the Court also argued that the injunctions sought should not be granted on a number of other grounds including the question whether damages would be an adequate remedy, the question whether there was a serious issue to be tried, the utility of any such injunction and the balance of convenience/prejudice.
Jurisdiction
5. Article 15 of the New Court Law, under the heading
“Interim and Precautionary Measures” provides that “the DIFC Courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine applications for interim or precautionary measures relating to ……….. (4) Applications, claims, or current or future arbitral proceedings brought outside the DIFC seeking suitable precautionary measures within the DIFC”
. There has been discussion of the precise meaning of Article 15 (4) in
Trafigura Pte Ltd v Prateek Gupta
(2025) DIFC CA 001 (22 September 2025) at which it was accepted by Counsel and Court that an appropriate English translation ought to read as follows:
“The DIFC Courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine applications for interim or precautionary measures relating to the following …. (4) Applications, claims or current or future arbitral proceedings brought outside the DIFC provided that the suitable precautionary measures are taken within the DIFC”
. The Fourth Respondent submits that the Applicants have not sought any precautionary measures within the DIFC and have not identified any precautionary measures to be taken within the DIFC, let alone suitable measures.
6. I should say here, that no reliance was placed on Article 24.3 of the Arbitration Law and I agree that it adds nothing to the debate and do not therefore consider it further.
7. The Applicants accept that:
7.1. The First Respondent is a legal entity licensed by the Dubai Department of Economic Development as a Government Liaison Office and recognised by the Italian Government operating abroad. It operates from an address in onshore Dubai, not the DIFC.
7.2. The Second Respondent is the current President and one of the two statutory managers as a matter of UAE Company Law of the First Respondent.
7.3. The Third Respondent is the Director General of the First Respondent and the other statutory manager.
7.4. None of the Applicants or the four individual Respondents is resident in the DIFC, although some are resident in onshore Dubai.
7.5. The contested election took place at an hotel in onshore Dubai, not the DIFC.
7.6. All communications relied on passed between the Applicants (usually the First Applicant) and the First and/or Second and/or Third Respondent.
7.7. Any records of the kind which the proposed injunction would preserve are not to be found in the DIFC.
8. It is contended by the First and Fourth Respondent that this matter has no connection with the DIFC at all and that there is no jurisdictional gateway available to the DIFC Court save for Article 15.4, which cannot apply here because the Applicants have not sought any suitable precautionary measures within the DIFC itself, nor identified any such precautionary measures to be taken within the DIFC.
9. It is clear on the face of the Claim Form, the Application and the Affidavits sworn in support that it is not said that any documents to be preserved are within the DIFC nor that any action to be restrained would, if not restrained, take place within the DIFC. The draft of the Order sought by the Applicants has no geographical restriction of any kind. It simply provides that
“until determination of the Intended arbitration or further order of the Court, the First Respondent and Second and Third respondents must not…..”
, whether by themselves or through others give legal or practical effect of the results of the contested elections, participate in any handover of offices mandates governance powers to the newly elected officers and Board or hold out any person as duly elected pursuant to the contested election. It further orders preservation of the documents to which I have already referred.
10. Mr Rodrigo Care for the Applicants submitted that the DIFC Court had jurisdiction in relation to the orders sought because of the enforcement jurisdiction which the Court of Appeal had clarified in
Trafigura
(ibid), by reference to the
Broad Idea
principles, and the terms of the New York Convention which would make any award in Milan recognisable and enforceable in DIFC under Article 42 of the Arbitration Law and by conduit jurisdiction in on shore Dubai. It was submitted that because a world wide freezing injunction could be made in support of arbitral or foreign proceedings, where there was no separate gateway for DIFC jurisdiction for the substantive claim, on the basis that enforcement of a money judgment might be needed in DIFC in respect of such a recognised judgment or award of a foreign Court or Tribunal, an injunction of the kind sought here could be made in order to prevent any thwarting of an order which might ultimately be made in arbitration in Milan, rendering the contested election invalid. In support of this submission, reliance was placed on passages in the judgements in
Carmon Reestrutura- engenharia E Servicos Tecnios Especiais (SU) LDA v AnonioCatete Lopes Cuenda
[2024] DIFC CA 003 and
Techteryx Ltd v Aria Commodities and others
(17 October 2025) DEC- 001-2025 as well as that of the majority in the Privy Council in
Broad Idea International Ltd v Convoy Collateral Ltd and others
[2021]UKPC 24. In the same way as the DIFC Court has been held to have jurisdiction to recognise a foreign judgment in the DIFC when there are no assets there against which to enforce it which can then be “exported” to on shore Dubai, it being the Applicants’ case that the strong connection with on shore Dubai and public policy meant that the enforcement jurisdiction should be available for any Milan Arbitration Award and any injunction sought which would prevent such an award being thwarted.
11. I am unable to accept Mr Care’s submissions, having considered the various parts of the judgments on which he relied.
Carmon
(ibid) falls to be considered in the light of the New Court Law and the later decisions relating to that statute. The key parts of the Court of Appeal judgement in
Trafigura
are decisive of the issue and to be found at paragraphs 127-137.
11.1. At paragraph 128, it was said that
“a freezing order of the kind sought by the Appellants does not require a separate head of jurisdiction if sought in aid of an enforcement jurisdiction which may be enlivened by the award of judgement in a foreign court’s judgements are recognised and enforced in the DIFC.”
11.2. At paragraph 130, by reference to the decision in Carmon under the previous statutes, it was said that the powers available to grant interim remedies under part 25 of the RDC were
“available to prevent the Court’s jurisdiction being thwarted”
which
“includes its jurisdiction to recognise and enforce foreign judgements. That jurisdiction may be thwarted if a party to a foreign proceedings seeks to dissipate its assets in advance of an apprehended judgement which might be susceptible to recognition and enforcement in the DIFC”
.
11.3. It was then said at paragraphs 131 – 132 that the New Court Law did not affect the correctness of that proposition and that
“in any event, Article 15.4, read with the opening words of Article 15, expressly confers the jurisdiction which authorises the exercise of the measures referred to in Article 15.4. That conferral of itself provides a complete answer to the Respondent’s’ challenge to jurisdiction.”
11.4. At paragraph 134, after citing the terms of Article 15.4, the Court said that it would plainly cover applications brought in the DIFC Court relating to proceedings outside the DIFC (which would include arbitration as well as foreign court proceedings). It followed that comment by saying this:
“Whatever the full scope of the jurisdiction, it encompasses interim measures taken out in the DIFC
in aid of proceedings which could yield a judgement recognised and enforced in the DIFC
. This includes interim measures such as freezing orders which would prevent the enforcement procedures of the DIFC in relation to foreign judgements from being thwarted. The jurisdiction would extend to orders sought in the DIFC for disclosure of assets and other information relevant to the conduct of the foreign proceedings and enforcement of any judgement issuing from them, whether in the DIFC or in the foreign jurisdiction.” [emphasis added].
11.5. At paragraph 135, the Court said that nothing turned on the differing translations of article 15.4, since the words “providing that” constituted a connecting term and not a term limiting the subject matter of
“suitable precautionary measures within the DIFC”
. What mattered was that the precautionary measures to which the opening words of Article 15 referred had to relate to
arbitral proceedings brought outside the DIFC
, where what was being sought was a precautionary measure within the DIFC.
12. The judgment of Lord Legatt in
Broad Idea
(ibid) does not advance the Applicant’s arguments. In that case, as pointed out at paragraphs 84-85, a freezing injunction is different in character from other interlocutory injunctions which grant, on a temporary and provisional basis the substantive relief claimed by the applicant. The freezing injunction does not enforce anything but merely prepares the ground for possible execution by different means in the future. The applicant claims no interest in the absence but seeks an inhibition of dealings with them simply in order to keep them available for possible future execution to satisfy an unconnected claim. There is no need for the Court to have jurisdiction over the substantive cause of action for the Court to grant a freezing order, but in English law terms, the Court must have personal jurisdiction over the party against whom such an order is made. In the DIFC, personal jurisdiction is not created by service but exists solely by virtue or statute and the sole basis for such jurisdiction as is claimed here is Article 15.4.
13. It does not help the Applicants to refer here to the “enforcement principle” because any arbitral award would have no reference to actions to be taken, or not to be taken, in the DIFC. None of the actions complained of did take place in the DIFC and none of the entities or individuals concerned are DIFC Bodies or DIFC Establishments. The Award simply would not operate in respect of acts or omissions in the DIFC and no purpose would be served in any application for recognition or enforcement in the DIFC, save for any attempt to exported to a jurisdiction, such as onshore Dubai, where such acts or omissions might take place. No order by the arbitral Tribunal would be capable of enforcement in the DIFC, unlike a freezing order where monies might be found thereto satisfy a foreign judgment or award. Whereas a freezing order will catch monies which might otherwise be dissipated to frustrate a future judgement or foreign court or award of a foreign tribunal so that it would catch monies in the DIFC coming within the jurisdiction thereafter, so that any monetary judgement or award could be enforced in the DIFC as well as exported to onshore Dubai, the same cannot be said of a declaration of invalidity, nullity, void ability or ineffectiveness of a contested election or the exclusionary measures taken on 17 December 2025.
14. If an order was made in the terms sought by the Applicants, it would have no impact within the jurisdiction of the DIFC because no conduct of the kind restrained thereby was ever going to happen within the jurisdiction. The injunction would, on its face, apply worldwide to the Respondents, none of whom are subject otherwise to the court’s jurisdiction and against whom the DIFC Court would have no power of enforcement. No
“precautionary measures within the DIFC”
are being sought at all in the Applicants’ claims in this Court, the sole purpose being the export of the precautionary measures ordered by this Court to onshore Dubai, where such actions could occur as the result of actions already taken there. There is nothing in the New Court Law which puts a connection with onshore Dubai into a different category for the purposes of construing it and in particular Article 15.4. The Award sought in arbitration, as appears hereafter, could not yield a judgment which could be enforced in the DIFC because the relief sought would not relate to any conduct to be taken in the DIFC.
15. As a matter of jurisdiction, therefore, what the Applicants seek does not fall within the terms of Article 15.4. As stated above, the enforcement principle as enunciated in Broad Idea (ibid) and the DIFC cases which drew on that decision for support, does not assist the Applicants. Unlike in the situation where freezing orders have been granted and enforcement in the DIFC of a foreign Court money judgement (or arbitral award to the same effect) could be foreseen, the orders sought in the Milan arbitration would not give rise to any potential for enforcement in the DIFC. The Request for Arbitration seeks decisions from the Arbitrator on the nullity of the exclusion measure of 17 December 2025 and the election which followed, a determination that the candidates on the Alternative List were validly appointed (on the basis of ballot papers which indicated votes in their favour despite their exclusion) or alternatively an order for a fresh General Assembly with a new vote. None of that has or could have any impact in the DIFC.
16. There is no question of the Court’s jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment or award being thwarted absent the grant of the injunction sought because the Court could not enforce the award in the terms sought by the Applicants in the arbitration. The Applicants therefore gain no assistance from dicta in Techteryx either, where the meaning of Article 15.4 is discussed at paragraphs 49-59. As His Excellency Justice Michael Black said at paragraph 59,
“the question is whether there is a sufficient likelihood that a judgement enforceable through the process of the BVI court will be obtained and a sufficient risk that without a freezing injunction, execution of the judgement will be thwarted, to justify the relief.
Transported into the case of an interlocutory injunction of the kind sought here, the question is whether execution of a judgement in the DIFC would be thwarted without such relief to which the answer is no because no such judgement in the terms of the putative award could be executed in the DIFC in any event.
17. As discussed in argument, the jurisdiction of the DIFC Court is defined by reference to an application for interim or precautionary measures which relate to current arbitral proceedings outside the DIFC
“providing that the suitable precautionary measures are taken within the DIFC”
. If the word “suitable” is taken to mean apt or just and convenient¸ I have no doubts that the precautionary measures sought by the Applicants here do not fall into that category. In the context of the arbitration where the remedies sought are as I have just described, and in a situation where proceedings are being taken by the Applicants in onshore Dubai against the Second and Third Respondents in their capacity as statutory managers of the First Respondents, with all the factors to be weighed in a forum conveniens argument militating in favour of onshore Dubai as the forum in which precautionary measures should be taken, I do not see how it can be said that the Applicants are making an application for
“suitable”
precautionary measures within the DIFC relating to arbitral proceedings brought outside it, within the meaning of Article 15.4. Whether that is seen as a matter of jurisdiction or discretion is probably neither here nor there in the overall context of this matter, but on the face of the wording of the Article, it appears to be a jurisdiction issue.
The American Cyanamid tests
18. It may well be that damages would not be an adequate remedy because of the reputational impact of what is said to have taken place and because the effect of the First Respondent being run by those who have been invalidly elected is hard to evaluate. It appears that there are serious issues to be tried as a matter of Italian law which governs the Articles of Association of the First Respondent where failures in natural justice and breaches of the Articles are alleged. The balance of convenience or prejudice is not easy to discern because little information has been provided to the Court about the activities of the First Respondent which appear essentially to be the promotion of Italian/UAE trade and related interests. What might be the effect of an unconstitutional President and board is unclear and the suggestion that the invalidly elected Board might seek to expel the First Applicant for membership is speculative and would give rise to a further dispute which again would have to be determined in arbitration but which would give rise to much the same issues as are already in being.
Discretion and Utility
19. I do not consider that the injunction sought, if granted, would have any utility at all if it stood on its own and could not be exported elsewhere. Its sole utility is its potential for export to onshore Dubai where other proceedings are already taking place and where it is possible to obtain interim relief of the same kind under Article 21 of the Civil Procedure Code. Furthermore, an order for precautionary measures is one which an arbitrator would be entitled to make under Article 26 of the Rules of the Milan Chamber of Arbitration and an emergency arbitrator could be appointed under Rule 44 in case of urgency. For the reasons already expressed, the DIFC is not an appropriate forum for the orders sought, even if it has jurisdiction to do so. In a case of extreme urgency, and the inability to appoint an emergency arbitrator to determine whether such an order would be appropriately issued in arbitration, the likely order that this Court would make, if it considered it had jurisdiction, would only be to restrain the putting into effect of the contested elections until such time as the arbitral Tribunal could take a view as to whether that was an appropriate interim measure or not.
Conclusion
20. In the circumstances, I do not consider that the Applicants are entitled to the orders sought and I dismiss the Injunction Applications. The parties agreed that I should not determine any question of costs until this judgement has been published to them and I therefore make an order that the parties make submissions on costs in writing as follows:
20.1. The First and the Fourth Respondents are to make submissions in writing within three working days of this Order, of no more than 4 pages each.
20.2. The Applicants are to respond to those submissions in writing (in no more than 6 pages) within three working days thereafter.
20.3. The First and the Fourth Respondents may reply to those submissions in writing within two working days thereafter, limited to 2 pages each.